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ABSTRACT
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in Asymmetric Differentiated Oligopoly
by
LU Juan
Master of Philosophy

Building an asymmetric differentiated goods quantity competition model, the present
paper explores how substitutability of products, one of the factors affecting the
unilateral effect, determines horizontal mergers and acquisitions equilibrium and
strategies. It seems intuitively obvious that the merger between firms with goods that
are sufficiently close substitutes can be more profitable. However, this thesis's
counter-intuitive results show that, for some parameter values, a merger is more
profitable for the merging firm when the target firm produces a distant substitutes
(i.e., when it is not the closest competitor to the acquiring firm in the market).The
theoretical analysis shows that to merge with firm with low substitute parameter is
more profitable provided that target firms are close enough and the both of them are
distant enough from merging firms. The results in Cournot model and Bertrand have
some similarities, for example, they both harm to consumer surplus and the optimal
strategy harms most. For the difference, for example, in Coumot model, whenever it
is profitable to merge with a distant competitor, it is the optimal strategy, while in
Bertrand model, it depends. The paper also extends the classical "horizontal merger
paradox" to a setting of asymmetric differentiated oligopoly.

Keywords: asymmetric oligopoly; horizontal merger; merger paradox.
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Chapter 1 Introduction

1.1 Background of Economics and Merger Guidelines
"Horizontal merger" refers to those companies with similar functions in production or
sale of comparable products merge that together and are direct competitors. In the
economic market, horizontal merger could be a double-edged sword. A merger could
enable merging parties to eliminate competition, enhance market power and reduce
unnecessary efficiency losses. Also, it could increase the risk of coordinated,
accommodating, or interdependent behavior among rivals and improve market power.
It is also possible to encourage monopoly, drastically increase price, discourage
innovation and reduce social welfare, which harm both consumers and potential
entries. Qiu and Zhou (2007) say that why firms merge and how they merge are the
focus of economic researchers. For this thesis, I also explore how a merging firm
could choose to merge.

Merger guidelines and policy enforcement provide a useful benchmark for evaluating
a merger. It is widely agreed that Merger Guidelines provide a benchmark for
evaluating a merger and they have experienced several large changes. In 1960s,
merger policy tends to in part reflect that the authorities seems desire to preserve and
protect small business for noneconomic reasons (Schmalensee, 1987, p.41).
According to the recent revised Merger Guidelines, the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) may consider horizontal merger to be an anticompetitive merger strategy
according to total market share and concentration. In August, 2010, the U.S.
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission issued Horizontal Merger

Guidelines!. These guidelines try to encapsulate the analytical techniques, practices,
and the enforcement policy of the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission (the Agencies) with respect to merger and acquisition, which may
involve actual and potential competitors, namely horizontal mergers, under the federal
laws. The agencies try to find ways to identify competitively harmful mergers and
avoid possible interference with mergers either competitively beneficial or neutral.
Types of evidence for these guidelines outline are adverse competitive effects, actual
effects observed in consummated mergers, direct comparison based on experience,
market shares and concentration in a relevant market, substantial head to head
competition, and disruptive role of a merging party. Since being issued, the Horizontal
Merger Guidelines have far-reaching influence on the development of anti-monopoly
control and they also reflect the information of the most forefront of relating practices
and theories. Although the guidelines describe some analytical techniques and types of
evidence to judge a horizontal merger lessening competition, there is much we could
do to help perfect the guidelines about how to judge a horizontal merger.

1.2 Motivation of this Thesis

Although there are enormous existing literatures about this issue, there is a huge
developing space of supporting theories and models behind these guidelines. This
paper thus tries to build a model to interpret companies' merger behavior and predict
the impacts of these merger behaviors on some factors, such as price, social welfare,
profit and output. Besides, it is known that horizontal mergers may drastically
increase price, decrease product quality, discourage innovation, and thus reduce
1

The original guidelines were published in 1982. These guidelines replace the Horizontal Merger Guidelines
issued in 1992, and revised in 1997. This change reflects the ongoing accumulation of experience at the agencies.
The commentary on the Horizontal Guidelines issued by the Agencies in 2006 remains a valuable supplement to
these Guidelines. When it is necessary, the agency would revise these guidelines from time to time to cover
changes in enforcement policy, to solve new problems under practice.
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social welfare. It is taken for granted that the competition effect of mergers depends
on product substitutability and the extent of such negative unilateral effect depends
on the degree of substitutability of non-merging firms in the relevant market. The
existing literatures have been exploring horizontal

mergers in symmetric

differentiated oligopoly and few consider asymmetric differentiated oligopoly. The
assumptions about symmetric differentiated oligopoly are divorced from the reality
and firms are expected to face more complicated situation. A firm, for instance, often
faces different types of firms target for acquisition, for example, firm 1 and firm 2
provide similar products, while firm 3 offers a more differentiated product. Is it ever
the case that it is always more profitable for a merging firm to acquire a closer
competitor which seems harms merging firm most?

How does the product

substitutability affect the incentives of merger? Exactly how firm incentive for
mergers depends on product substitutability is not well studied in the literature. In
this thesis, both Cournot and Bertrand models are developed to demonstrate these
questions. I believe that this is an auspicious point for suitable improvement in
economic theories and has reference value for both competition authorities and
merger firms.

On the other hand, related progress about horizontal merger in China economic market
is stagnant. Anti-monopoly law is the basic of market economy and it plays an
important role of promoting competitive mechanism and social welfare. Unfortunately,
China did not issue the first anti-monopoly law, which still cannot satisfy the market
demand of laws and bills until 2008. This law marks an important milestone in China's
antitrust regime. China' economy needs market competition to thrive in a healthy and
robust manner and related law issues have become first concerns of companies. The
3

fact that there would be substantial overlap between U.S. Guidelines and the
corresponding in China makes researches on U.S. Guidelines immediately applicable
to the guidelines in China. With these historical circumstances, the Chinese
government should borrow ideas from Horizontal Merger Guidelines and promote the
development of corresponding guidelines according to actual state of economic
development in China.

1.30utline of the Thesis

This thesis begins with a comprehensive overview of the economic theories about
horizontal mergers. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the related literature and
attempt to clarify complicated research issues about horizontal merger. In this section,
I would definitely stress the concept of "merger paradox" first intensified by Salant
et al. (1983), which demonstrates that a merger is not always profitable in Cournot
market with homogeneous firms and when the market share exceed 80 percent then
the merger can be profitable. Further, the literature studies are classified into a few
sorts: price, quantity and profit effects, profitability, concentration and market
structure, welfare and efficiency, cost consideration, entry and exit, product
substitutability, other related literature and literature remarks. This classification also
offers perspectives to understand economic theories behind merger guidelines.
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 focus on horizontal mergers under asymmetric Cournot and
Bertrand competition models. In these sections, I present differentiated products
Cournot and Bertrand competition models with two different substitute indexes and
derive a set of lemmas and propositions. Definitely, these two parts answers the
question regarding a firm's best merger strategies when facing firms with different
product substitutability. For chapter 5, comparisons between Bertrand and Cournot
4

model are developed. In Chapter 6, I move my focus to the analysis of policy
implication and the application of this research to the guidelines.

1.4 Contribution to the Existing Literature

Much of the literature has stayed with product homogeneity assumption or
symmetric differentiated oligopoly. But I am unaware of studies which consider
further differentiated oligopoly about horizontal merger. This main contribution of
this thesis lies in the relaxation of symmetric differentiated oligopoly. The purpose of
this relaxation is to demonstrate how the web of substitute parameters affects merger
strategies and I will emphasize the importance of competitive effects analysis.

Under the assumption of homogeneity or symmetric differentiated oligopoly,
researchers found that a merger can be profitable only when the substitution
parameter is sufficiently small in Cournot goods market and the non-merging firms
tend to benefit from a merger. For instance, Salantet al. (1983) points out that a
merger is profitable only if when the merger is more than 80 percent pre-merger
market share. Hsu and Wang (2010), using standard differentiated goods quantity
competition setting, demonstrate that a merger between two firms distant enough is
profitable and conclude that differentiated goods markets encourage many more
mergers than homogeneous goods market. While researchers as Deneckere and
Davidson (1985), using Shubik-type demand system, study the merger paradox in
symmetric price competition and show that mergers of any size are beneficial. It is a
worthwhile job further to extend the symmetric oligopoly model to asymmetric
oligopoly model. Asymmetry in this thesis refers to product substitutability and we
use substitute parameters to describe this. As far as substitute parameter is concerned,
the U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines in 2010 state briefly that when products are
5

close substitute they compete strongly with each other and a merger is expected to
diminish competition by raising price one or both products. In other words,
substitutability among products would definitely influence the extent of diminishing
competition and thus affect the merger decisions of merging firms. It is obvious that
the results in Bertrand case can be in sharp contrast to Cournot case and therefore
this thesis would take the two situations into consideration and analyze them
respectively.

Sizable existing literatures make research on the issue of horizontal merger from
distinct perspectives. Researches on the price and profit effects are definitely the
fundamental and primitive (As Barton and Sherman (1984), Perry and Porter, Fareell
and Shapiro (1988), Higgins, Johnson and Sullivan (2005), Mizuno (2009),
Fridolfsson and Stennek (2010).). When considering profitability, researchers
introduce the concept of "Insiders' dilemma" or "Merger paradox", which later
become one of focuses of researches and they even try to solve this problem(As
Stigler (1950), Salant et al. (1983), Farrell and Shapiro (1990), Lindqvist and
Stennek (2005), Cesi (2010)). Some literature concentrates on concentration or
market structure and provides theory support for merger guidelines to some extent
(As Huck, Konrad and Muller (2004), Fridolfsson and Stennek (2010), Hendricks
and Mcafee (2010)). Another significant consideration about horizontal merger is
welfare and efficiency (As Farrell and Shapiro ( 1988), Zhou (2008), Mizuno (2009),
Oldale and Padilla (2010), Verge (2010), Fridolfsson ·and Stennek (2010), Gelves
(20 10), Erkal and Piccinin (20 10)). Besides, the character of cost is an important
factor affecting horizontal merger and attracts much attention (As Ferreira (2010),
Farrell and Shapiro (1988), Gelves (2010)). Whether a merger induces an entry or
6

exit, equilibrium merger tend to be different since when there is an entry or exit, the
market structure is changed and the resulting consequences relevant to horizontal
merger are supposed to be influenced (As Gowrisankaran ( 1999), Filson and
Sonsamphant (2005), Erkal and Piccinin (2010)). In the later literature section, I will
also recite some literature discussing other aspects of horizontal merger. With regard
to asymmetric product substitute, few researchers discuss this topic in details (As
Deneckere and Davidson (1985), Ramaswamy (1997)). Although, to further consider
this issue is complicated and challenging, it is a worthwhile job to explore and this
thesis will try to contribute in this aspect.

This thesis attempts to study how the firm incentive for mergers depends on product
substitutability and what the resulting unilateral anticompetitive effects are after
merger in my assumption. The merged firms and its rivals both has the motive power
to pursue their unilateral self-interests and a horizontal merger drive the merged firm
to charge a higher price, and lower the output while non-merging firms do not alter
their strategies (Werden and Froeb, 2006). This thesis firstly presents differentiated
products Cournot and Bertrand competition models with three firms and two
different substitute parameters. Under this assumption, there are several interesting
facts about horizontal merger, which are not found in homogeneous or symmetric
differentiated oligopoly. In asymmetric Counot oligopoly, first, the merger paradox
still exists and a profitable merger with a close competitor has the largest proportion
of portfolio of two different substitute parameters than a profitable merger with a
distant competitor. In other words, to merge with a close competitor is more "likely"
to be profitable than to merge with a distant competitor. Second, very absorbing,
however, is whenever it is profitable to acquire a more distant competitor, it is the
7

optimal strategy, which is counter-intuitive. Since we usually believe that we should
always acquire the close competitor threatening us most. In later section, I would
develop my propositions rigorously and furnish this thesis's perspective of
comprehension. In asymmetric Bertrand oligopoly, any merger is profitable and it is
more profitable for a merging firm to acquire a close firm and dropping is possible in
Bertrand. Similarly, I will definitely describe and prove them in strict economic
methods. Although, there are limitations to my thesis, it commendably contributes to
the existing literature about horizontal merger by exploring asymmetric differentiated
oligopoly and extending our discussion about horizontal merger.

8

Chapter 2 Literature Review
2.1Price, Quantity and Profit Effects of Horizontal Merger
This thesis will analyze the literature on pnce, quantity and profits effects of
horizontal merger as the starting point. Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) come to
the conclusion that the output of insiders contracts and the output of the outsiders
expands after a merger. Using data covering a ten year period from the merger
between Xidex Corporation and its two competitors, Barton and Sherman ( 1984) test
the price and profit effect. Their results indicate that price increases can be traced to
the acquisitions. They also find that the raising price result into firm's profit gain
which is enough to cover the cost of acquisition. Perry and Porter ( 1985) believe that
a merger result in a price increase and the incentive to merge is determined by two
forces, the first is the price increase and the second the output reduction. And, they
point out that the S-S-R mode could severely underestimate the incentive to merge
but once the merged firm is allowed to be large as each partner, the reduction of
output would be lower than in the S-S-R model. Farrell and Shapiro ( 1990) analyze
the mergers as transfer of capital and develop the proposition that under some
conditions a small transfer of capital from firm one firm to another would reduce
output and increase price. They point out that when a weighted sum of other firms'
market shares are large compared to participants' market shares, external effects is
positively connected to capital transfer. One ambiguous result is that increasing
capital's concentration is beneficial to raise overall welfare even when it increases
price.

Rather differently with the view that a merger is supposed to raise the prices of both
the merged and merging firms when considering the model of Cournot Oligopoly
9

(See, for example, Werden and Froeb (1994), Shapiro (1996)), Higgins, Johnson, and
Sullivan (2005) hold that merger of competitors does not necessarily raise the prices
in the Bertrand competition model. Actually, the merger can increase consumer
welfare. This is one of the reasons why this thesis will consider both the Cournot and
Bertrand Oligopoly models for the same issue. Fridolfsson and Stennek (2010)
present their endogenous mergers and demonstrate that competitors' share prices may
be reduced by anti-competitive mergers when there is announcement or rumor that
informs the market that the competitors fail to buy the target. They conclude that
anti-competitive mergers can still reduce competitors' share prices when increasing
their profits, which is very similar to the statement that not raising all prices does not
invoke efficiencies (See Higgins, Johnson, and Sullivan (2005)).

Werden and Froeb (2006) introduce and discuss important research about unilateral
effects in detail. "Horizontal mergers give rise to unilateral anticompetitive effects

if

they cause the merged firm to charge a higher price, produce a lower output, or
otherwise act less intensely competitive than the merging firms, while non-merging
rivals do not alter their strategies". Firstly, the economic theory underlying the
unilateral competitive effects of mergers is reviewed and then, two classes of
empirical methods to predict quantitatively the unilateral effects of proposed mergers
will be applied.

2.2Discussions on Profitability

With regards to profitability, the most well-known issue is the merger paradox.
Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983), Szidarowsky and Yakowitz (1982), and
Davidson and Deneckere (1985) all put forward that a merger is not necessarily
10

always profitable and a merger is possible to reduce the profits of participating firms.
Increase in production by outsiders following the merger is possible to reduce insider
profits, which is thus less than the increase in equilibrium profits when the outsider
output is hold constant. And a merger is profitable only if the concentration of firms
exceed 80 percent (See Salant et al. (1983)). The results in my Cournot are consistent
with their demonstration that not all mergers are expected to be beneficial to firm's
profits. While in differentiated products price competition model, a merger is always
beneficial to existing firms and the profitability increases with the increasing of
merger size (See Deneckere and Davidson (1985)).

There are different opinions about this issue. For instance, Huck, Konrad and Muller
'

(2004) find that a merger with commitment by governance or endogenous
commitment is profitable in symmetric linear Cournot markets with more than four
firms. When considering the profitability of horizontal mergers in the dynamic
competition with price stickiness, Dockner and Gaunersdorfer (200 1) conclude that
any total number of mergers between two and ten in the case of dynamic competition.
Benchekroun (2003) shows that when firms use open-loop strategies, large market
share is needed to guarantee a profitable merger and when firms use feedback
strategies, even an arbitrarily small market share is enough to lead to a profitable
merger. Besides, the author demonstrates that in closed-loop environment more
competitors is even more harmful and thus a coalition through a merger, even of
small size, is attractive. Many of researchers have been trying to revise the original
model to analyze the profitability of mergers, as Perry and Porter (1985) replace the
original constant costs assumption with quadratic costs assumption. Faul-Oller (1997)
set costs of two different firms as asymmetric. Huck et al. (2004) add the variable of
11

information to the model. Hsu and Wang (20 10) point that a two firm merger is
profitable provided that the goods are distant substitutes enough when they study
horizontal merger in a differentiated Cournot Oligopoly. Zhou (2008) builds a model
in which firms are uncertain about productions costs. Information structure
determines firms' incentives to merger and, when possessing more complete
information, firms are less attracted to merge. Cesi (20 10) shows a bilateral
horizontal merger is profitable when a stick and carrot strategy equilibrium exists.

2.3Concentration and Market Structure

Market shares and Concentration in a relevant market is one of the evidences of
adverse competitive effects used by the agencies to address the question of whether a
merger substantially lessens competition. Normally, the agencies calculate market
shares to reflect firms' competitive significance. One useful indicator of likely
competitive effects of a merger is market concentration. The traditional measurement
of concentration is Hirsman-Herfindahl Index (HHI). HHI index refers to the sum of
the squared market shares of firms and is assumed to be proportional to the
difference between price and cost and is zero for perfect competition and one for
monopoly. In the U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines of 2010, the agencies classify
markets into three types: unconcentrated markets with HHI below 1500, moderately
concentrated markets with HHI between 1500 and 2500, and highly concentrated
markets with HHI above 2500.As the major criteria of concentration analysis by the
U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, HHI, to some extent,
help to evaluate concentration of mergers and tend to be useful. But, there are
moments when it fails, e.g. Farrell and Shapiro (1988) conclude that to measure the
concentration using HHI index when it is already high is misleading since both the
12

distribution of outputs across firms and aggregate output level are important aspects
of industry performance, and thus some researchers try to solve this problem. For
example, Hendricks and Mcafee (2010) develop an alternative theory applying to
intermediate goods industries with large number of firms to expand HHI inapplicable
when market is concentrated. When there is no market power, the new index system
specializes to the HHI. But, limitations of their development still exist: their theory is
restricted to homogenous good markets and the extension of theoretical approach to
differentiated markets is still challenging.

2.4Welfare and Efficiency

With respect to efficiencies, the Horizontal merger guidelines demonstrate that
merger-generated efficiencies is beneficial to competition and help to counteract the
negative effects of merger since two ineffective competitors is able to form a more
effective competitor, e.g., by combing complementary assets. Nevertheless, it is
difficult to verify and quantify efficiency because, in part, the much of related
information is possessed by the merging firms. When a merger has sufficiently
cognizable efficiencies, it is possible not to be challenged by the Agencies.

Welfare and efficiency discussions are not rare in the existing literatures. Williamson
(1968) explicitly investigates the welfare tradeoffs about scale economy and market
power effects in merger questions. Qiu (1997) compares the efficiency of Bertrand
and Counot equilibrium in a duopoly with R&D competition. The research finds that
Bertrand is not expect to achieve higher dynamic efficiency that Cournot. Debates
about consumer welfare and total welfare have been long-standing and hot topic in
the analysis of horizontal merger. Few of arguments about the use of consumer
13

welfare standard are convincing and optimal welfare standard is perhaps the total
welfare. Governments enacting merger legislation are encouraged to take the
long-run total welfare maximization as the target, but, the problem is it is difficult to
estimate and measure the long-run effects of a merger and thus it is not a practical
guide. It is suggested that the discussions on assessing whether to use a total or
consumer welfare standard is nonsense. And we should move the debate on this
controversy to how the short term price influence the long term outcomes for
consumers and economy and how to balance competition and efficiency (See Oldale
and Padilla 20 10).

Erkal and Piccinin (20 10) estimate how the consumer welfare is affected in
differentiated oligopolies with linear demand. They found all entry-inducing mergers
are harmful to consumer welfare since there are no sufficient large merger-generated
efficiencies and mergers inducing exit result in sufficiently high cost saving and is
beneficial to consumer welfare. Verge (2010) pays attention to the formal analysis of
structural remedies about merger and shows that it turns out to be useful only a very
limited set of cases. When divested assets are transferred to a single outsider or the
largest firm is not big enough in a market with three firms, consumer surplus hurts by
the merger and the merger should be blocked.

2.5Costs Consideration

Cost is an important factor and different researches consider costs from distinct
perspectives when analyzing horizontal mergers and resulting competitive effects.
Some scholars assume costs as uncertain and explore the competitive effects of
mergers. For example, Perry and Porter (1985) assume that the cost function is
14

determined by the firm's fraction of the capital stock and the output x, further, cost
function is linearly homogenous in the fraction of capital stock and output. Thus,
constant returns to scale are result in and the possibility of scale economies as a motive
for merger is ruled out. Farell and Shapiro ( 1988) do the equilibrium analysis of
horizontal mergers with the assumption of quadratic costs and constant marginal costs.
In the paper mentioned before by Gelves (2010), costs are assumed to be asymmetry
between leader and follower in the Stackelberg model. Ferreira (2010) deal with rivals'
costs with incomplete information and make the assumption that uncertainty is
uniformly distributed. Similarly research method is taken by Zhou (2008) who
consider horizontal merger when firms is faced with production shock and future costs
are uncertain.

2.6Entry and Exit

Entry is also mentioned in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, and timeliness,
likelihood, and sufficiency of the entry efforts an entrant might practically employ
are examined by the agencies. Through huge amount of literature, I find there is
limited literatures about entry and exit exist and it turns out to be a significant aspect
about horizontal mergers and even could be a tool for antitrust policy analysis. Entry is
proved to be a factor to defer mergers between firms and decrease the profitability of
mergers (See Gowrisankaran( 1999), Erkal and Piccinin (20 10)) and, on the contrary,
the probability of mergers could also influence the entry and exit of firms (See
Gowrisankaran ( 1999), Filson and Songsamphant (2005)). Gowrisankaran ( 1999)
finds that if mergers are allowed entry rate will significantly increase while the exit
rate drops dramatically, and exit scrap value and changes in entry costs affect
differently on the probabilities of both entry and exit. Erkal and Piccinin (2010) point
15

out that entry acts as a deterrent to competitive effects of horizontal merger and harms
consumer welfare (See welfare and efficiency part in this chapter), nevertheless, the
merger guidelines does not emphasize the relationship between entry and
merger-generated efficiencies. Filson and Songsamphant (2005) analyze how the exit
is affected by horizontal mergers in declining industries.

2. 7 Product Substitutability

In this thesis, I will embark on related researches about how product substitutability

affects a horizontal merger. In 2010 U.S. Merger Guidelines, it is admitted that
competition may be harmed by a merger between firms selling differentiated
products and the agencies may consider two firms close substitutes by the level of
HHI in the markets with differentiated products. And a merger between close
differentiated products is possible to be challenged by the authority. Although, there
are large amount of literature discussing horizontal mergers, few expand the
discussion from homogenous products model or differentiated products model to
asymmetric product model. Hsu and Wang (20 10) build a differentiated Cournot
oligopoly model and illustrate sufficiently distant substitute goods could solve the
problem of merger paradox. When analyzing international merger, Qiu and Zhou
(2006) point out that the extent of product differentiation affects the profitability of
output coordination.

2.80ther Related Literature

Considering the development of merger guidelines for these years, this thesis
organizes the literature reviews in chronological order and thus we could easily
capture the trend of research about merger guidelines. There are large amount of
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literature concentrating in a few years after 1982, in which the revised merger
guidelines were released by Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission.
Some researchers criticize that the new Guidelines consider too many vague and
general factors and result in more uncertainty and unpredictability than old merger law
(See Sims& Blumenthal (1982), Turner (1982), Spivack (1982), and Harris & Jorde
(1983)). Clanton (1983) challenges this criticism and details how the new merger
guidelines make competition law applicable and understandable for the antitrust
authority and industry sectors. Although the market share, a crude measurement of
market power, is still not a perfect tool and is regarded with suspicion, it definitely
contributes to the new merger guidelines by making it more clear and predictable than
the old corresponding one. I believe that Kauper (1983) cannot agree more with
Clanton since he similarly concludes that the new merger guidelines develop
compared with the old one. According to Kauper's argument, some horizontal mergers
challenged under the old Guidelines would not be challenged under the new
Guidelines since the 1982 Guidelines divide the horizontal merger world by
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, the safe harbor provision: markets are not concentrated
if the post-merger HHI is below 1000, moderately concentrated if between 1000 and
1800 and highly concentrated if above 1800. Kauper's powerful contribution also lies
on his calling attention to efficiency, which now is the enforcement goal.

Schmalensee ( 1987) argues however that courts should not be required to consider the
efficiency effects of proposed mergers nor to take many other factors into account.
This paper also points out that competitive levels rather than present and likely future
levels should be the price baseline for Guidelines' market definition standard. After
1992 when the Merger Guidelines were revised again, Coate (2005) presents an
empirical analysis of merger enforcement and suggests that HHI is the best to predict
17

the enforcement decisions when the relevant theory is collusion and the number of
significant rivals is the best when the relevant theory is unilateral effects. When
researchers focus their work on merger guidelines, Foer (200 1) moves forward to
explore horizontal merger remedy guidelines as an addendum and even proposes a
working draft. After 2002, in which year the European Commission adopts a proposal
to amend the EC Merger Regulation (ECMR), some researches focus on analyzing the
similarities and differences of economic analysis about horizontal mergers in U.S. and
EU competition law even focus on EU competition law (See Coppi& Walker (2004 ),
Verouden, Bengtsson & Albaek (2004 ), and Bergman, Coate, J akobsson & Ulrick
(2006), Gilbert & Rubinfeld (2010)).

Besides focusing on the content of merger guidelines, it is a worthwhile job to test or
derive the best policy for the authority to consider. As Nocke and Whinston (2010)
demonstrate, an antitrust authority can adopt dynamically optimal policy to maximize
the discounted expected consumer surplus and decide whether or not to approve a
merger. It is pointed out that the analysis of market definition has some limitations
and the U.S. Guidelines and guidelines more generally are suggested to emphasize
the importance of competitive effects analysis in merger evaluations (See Gilbert and
Rubinfeld (2010)). Some researchers are interested in comparing European versus
the United States merger policies (See, e.g. Bergman, Coate, Jakobsson, and Ulrick
(2010)).

Qiu and Zhou (2007) study the merger dynamic process by developing an
endogenous mergers model. They identify firm heterogeneity and negative demand
shocks as the two necessary conditions for merger to occur. Some mergers occur
18

because of negative demand shock and some because of strategic reasons.

19

Chapter 3 Horizontal Mergers under Cournot Competition

3.1 Theoretical Framework

Most of existing literature focused on horizontal mergers in a homogenous or
symmetric differentiated market. This paper will mainly focus on markets with
asymmetric markets, namely where the degree of substitutability across products is
different.

Specifically, I consider a three-firm industry producing three differentiated products
indexed by i=1,2,3. I also assume the following inverse demand system for the three
products:
p, =a -q,- /)qz- '}q3

Pz = a - q2 - f3q, -

(I)

'}q3

P3 = a - q3 - '}!J, - '}q2
Where P; is the price for each product, q; is the quantity for each product,

P is the

substitute parameter between firm 1 and firm 2, "( is the substitute parameter between
firm 3 and firm 1 or firm 2. In other words, for firm 1, firm 2 is the close competitor
and firm 3 is the distant competitor, then the relationship between

p and 'Y should be

O<r</3'5:1.

Mainly for tractability, I assume that production involves zero marginal cost and no
fixed cost for the three' firms (i=1, 2, 3). No entry is assumed. Firms compete by
choosing quantities both before and after a merger. Since there are just three firms in
the market, it is assumed that any merger is two-firm merger (bilateral merger).
Because the developed demand market is asymmetric, we further assume that firm 1 is
the initiator of a merger, namely the merging firm and chooses to merge with firm 2 or
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firm 3hn this thesis, a proposer (acquirer) refers to the firm proposing a merger and
a target refers to the firm receiving the proposal. As we know that firms are always
seeking for commercial profits, thus the merged entity will choose production
quantities of two products to maximize its profit if a merger happens and the total
profits of merged entity should be (n~ 1 ' 21 + n~l, 2 )) when firm 2 is the target and be
(TI~ 1 • 3 > + Tij1•3>) when firm 3 is the target. Before merger, the equilibrium prices,

quantities and profits are represented by

(p;,q;,n) (i=1,2,3); After the merger

between firm 1 and firm 2, the prices, quantities and profits are represented by

.n:I. >)(i=1,2,3); After the merger between firm 1 and firm 3, the prices,

(pr1.2> ,q?· 2 >

2

quantities and profits are represented by ( P;0 •3>, q?· 3>,

n:

13
•

>) (i= 1,2,3 ).

Firm 1 is the merging firm in the first stage and it chooses to merge with firm 2 or firm
3, firm 2 is the close competitor for firm 1 and firm 3 is the distant competitor. The
first thing that the acquirer should consider is whether to acquire another firm I
(i=2,3) is profitable since there is possibility that benefits of insider by merger would
be offset by outsiders and when both firm 2 and firm 3 are profitable mergers, the
merging party considers which one to merge. Otherwise, it is enough for the merging
entity to merge the profitable firm. Salant et al. (1983) formulates the unprofitability
of merger as "merger paradox". This well-known consideration will be discussed in
later sections of this thesis. Wlien the target receives the proposal and the new market
evolves to the state of equilibrium, the first stage ends. In the second stage, the
three-firm industry develops to duopoly, and firms are lured to go a step further and

2

As a matter of fact, both firm 2 and firm 3 could be the merging firm, if firm 2 is the merging firm we would meet with
the similar results as if the firm 1 is the merging firm, the only difference is just the expositions; if firm 3 is the merging
firm, we will lose the values of asymmetric consideration since firm 2 is as distant as firm 1 from firm 3(Note, one of
crucial question we want to explore is: merging firm should merge the distant competitor or the close competitor.)
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merge to a monopoly. Nevertheless, this is not the point of my discussion in this
thesis and monopoly is not allowed. Thus, it is not necessary to put much effort in the
second stage mentioned above. Here comes my first assumption.

Assumption 1 Duopoly is allowed when a merger happens, but a merge is not
allowed to proceed up to monopoly. 3

Before a merger occurs, each firm chooses quantity to maximize its own profit

The first order conditions in the Coumot equilibriumas follow:

aanl =a- 2ql- fJqz- yq3 = 0
ql
an z =a-2q2 -f3q~-rq3 =O
-a

(2)

q2

an =a-2q3 -rql -rq2 =O
-a
3

%
And the second-order conditions are:
2

a ni < o ·-1 2 3
-a
qi
2

l-,

-

,

The equilibrium quantities, prices, and profits are as follows:
•
•
a(y-2)
• a(2y-fJ-2)
q1 =q2 =2(y-fJ-2),q3 = 2(y-fJ-2)

•

•

•

n
•

a(y- 2)

•

a(2y- fJ- 2)

= Pz = 2(T- fJ- 2), P3 = 2(T- fJ- 2)

Pi

a 2(y-2) 2
•
a\2r-/3-2) 2
=Ilz= 4(r-/3-2)2'I13= 4(r-/3:._2)2
•

•

a2 (y- 2)2

•

•

n +n2 = 2cr _,a_ 2)2 •n +n, =
3

(3)

(4)
(5)

a2 [ (y- 2)2 + (2y- ,8- 2)2 J

r _,a_ 2)2

4c

The same assumption is provided by Larry D. Qiu (2007) when he analyzes merger waves in a homogenous quantity
model. The author enumerates two justifications for this: the antitrust authority is expected to step in to prevent the firms'
substantially increasing market power and monopolization will utterly throw the discussions pointless and unjustifiable.
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Obviously, before a merger occurs, I have

p; = p; < p; and q; =q; < q; . In

the

Cournot equilibrium, firm 3 dominates the largest proportion of market share and
earns greater profit than do the other two firms, because its product is more
differentiated than the other two products.

Next, I derive the Cournot equilibrium, if firm 1 merges with firm 24 •

If firm 2 is the target, the merging party maximizes the total profits by choosing the

units of production for product 1 and product 2 and firm 3 maximizes its profit by
choosing its own product 3.

The first order conditions for the post-merger Cournot equilibrium are as follows:

(6)

And the second-order condition conditions are:

The corresponding equilibrium quantities, prices and profits are as follows:
q

o.z>
I

= q(I.Z> =

a(y- 2)

z

2(y -2/3-2)'

qo.z>
3

= a(y- f3 -1)

(y -2/3-2)

o.2)_ o.2)_a(fJ+l)(y-2) 0 .2)_ a(y-fJ-1)
Pt -p2 -2(y2-2fJ-2)'P3 -(y2-2fJ-2)

4

(7)
(8)

It is here assumed that there is no dropping product line after a merger. I later show that the merging
firms will choose not to drop any product after the merger.
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no.2>

= no.z> =a2 (y- 2) 2p
( +I)
2

4<r-2P-2) 2

I

2

no.z> =a (y3
•

2

2

p -I) 2

<r-2P-2) 2

(9)

p

no.z> + n<I.Z> =a (y- 2) ( +I)
I

2

2<r -2P-2)2

If firm 3 is the target, the merging parties maximize the total profits by choosing the
units of production for product 1 and 3 and firm 2 maximizes its profit by choosing
its own product 2.

The first order conditions for the merging firms are as follows:

(10)

And the second-order conditions are, respectively:

Then the equilibrium quantities, prices and profits are as follows:
<r-2)(y-2+P)
- 2(4-5f-P 2 +2Pf)

o.J> _
ql

(1.3) _

3

q

-

0 •3>_

q2

a(p- 2)(3y- P- 2)
2(4-5f-P2 +2Pf)

(11)

a(l-y)(y+2-P)

-<4-5f-P2 +2Pf)

a(4-5r +3/lr + /)y-2{3- rfJ
P!2(4-5r-P1 +2/3r)

2

(1,3)-

(1,3) _

p3
0 .3>

P1

-

a(4-4r- /3 2 + Pr -2r+ Pr+
2(4-sr-/31 +2/)r)

a(l- y)(y+ 2- /))
- (4-5r- /32 +2/3r)
_
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)

r)

(12)

nul= a

2

I

(y-2)(y-2+ jJ)(4-5r +3f3r + f3y-2f3 -2r/32)
4(4-sr- /3 2+2f3r)

no·')=

a2(1-y/(y+2-/3)2
2
2
<4-sr- /3 +2/3r)

Il(l.l)-

a (/3-2)(3y- /3-2)(4-4f- /3 + f3r -2y+ f3r+ y')

2

'
Il(I.]J
I

2

2

2

-

4(4-sr-f3 +2f3r)

+ Il(l.3)

=a

2

,

(13)

2

(y-2)(y-2+ j3)(4-5f +3f3r + f3y-2f3- rf3
4(4-sr-/32 +2/3r) 2

2

)

a2cp -2)<3r- f3-2)<4-4r- /32 + Pr -2r+ Pr+ r')
4(4-sr- /3 2 +2f3r) 2

+--~~~~--~~~~~~~~~~

I will also consider the effect of a merger on consumer surplus. Differentiating the
utility function with respect to quantity, the original inverse demand functions could
be calculated. I follow the work of Singh and Vives (1984) and Qiu(1997) and
assume the utility function as:

Consumer surplus refers the difference between utility of consuming goods and the
pay for goods and is formally as:
CS =U(qpqz.%)-

L

P;q;

i=l,2,3

Apply the price equations into utility functions and reorganize consumer equation as:
CS =U(qpq2 ,%)-

L P;q; =]_(q:
+qi +q; +2Pq q +2yq % +2yq %) (14)
2
1 2

1

2

i=l,2,3

I could also obtain the welfare (total surplus) as:
' 1 2 2 2 p
W = CS +TI = a(qt +q2 +%)-z(qt +q2 +% +2 qtqz+2yqlq3 +2yq2q3)(15)

3.2 Dropping Product Line

In this section, I look at whether dropping product one of two products is optimal for
the merging firm. Specifically, is it the best strategy for the merging party to drop
one of the owned two products after the merger? Product line decision is an
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important issue for both the merging and non-merging firms and related brand
positioning is also explicitly included in merger guidelines.

When firm 2 is the target, to drop product 1 or product 2 is the same for the merging
party and to drop product 1 is assumed.

Then the demand system becomes:
(16)

The first order conditions of equilibrium are as follow:
an
= a - 2q;-yqj=

o z,J=,
· · 2 3,l'#J
· ·

(17)

aqi

The second order conditions are as follow:
a2nidl
aqi2

<o
-

Corresponding price and quantities are respectively:

a

(1.2> Pidl

-

(

a

(1.2> -

2 + y) ,qidl

-

(

i- 2 3
+
y)
- •
2

(18)

The profit of merging party and firm 3 are:
n(l,2)
ldl

=

2

a
(2 + y)2

n(l,2)
'
3dl

=- a2
-(2 + y)2

(19)

When firm 3 is the target and the merging party chooses to drop product 1, repeat the
similar process as showed above, I obtain:
n(l,3)

=

3dl

2

a
(2 + y)2

n<l.3)
'
2dl

a2
(2 + y)2

=---

(20)

And when firm 3 is the target and the merging party chooses to drop product 3:
n<l.3)
ld3

Since

~

=

a2
(2 +

no.3>
/3)2 '
2d3

a2
(2 + /3)2

= -----:-

(21)

is larger than y, to drop product 1 is more profitable than to drop product 3

when firm 3 is the target of the merger.
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Product deletion is a part of the profit-maximization problem of the merging firm.
Before considering the profitability of merger, the merging firm would check
whether to drop or not a product line after a merger and then compare the largest
post-merger profits with pre-merger profits.

Lemma 1

The merging party has no incentive to drop product line after a merger in the
Coumot model.
Proof. See Appendix.
How a merger affects product variety could be quite ambiguous sometimes. Berry
and Waldfogel (200 1) demonstrate that, after mergers, firms are possible to withdraw
duplicative products to reduce the competition between similar products or to crowd
products together to preempt entry. Besides, cost reductions after consolidation
enable firms to increase variety by providing additional products. They find evidence
that increased concentration would not reduce variety and even increase the amount
of programming variety absolutely when they do empirical work to explore radio
broadcasting industry under the 1996 Telecom Act.

In my thesis, there are no entries and cost saving by assumption. Lemma 1 implies
3
thatiT 0I •2 ) +IT 20 •2 ) > n<d21•2 ) andiT<I1·3) +Il<31' 3) > n°·
) which indicates that if a merger
dl '
·

occurs, the merging firm is not willing to drop product line and product variety does
not change after a merger. It is concluded that consolidation of the market does not
reduce product variety in the Cournot Model.
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3.3 Special Case

Particularly when the substitute parameter between firm 1 and firm 2 equals to one,
firm 2 is coessential competitor of firm 1. Under this premise, y is the only unknown
substitute parameter the inverse demanding functions becomes:

Pt_=a-q, -q2 -;q3
P2 = a - q2 - q, - ')CJ3
P3 = a- q3 - ')CJ, - 'JCJ2
For convenience, we could make entitle this case as semi-asymmetry or
semi-symmetry. Before a merge happens, the firms choose their respective output to
maximize their own profits and we could arrive at the Nash-equilibrium solutions as
follows:
•
ql

•

(2-y)

•

(3-2y)

=q2 =a 2(3- r) ,% =a 2(3- r)

•
•
(2-y)
•
(3-2y)
PI = p2 =a 2(3- f) , PJ = a 2(3- f)
2
(2- r) n· -a2 (3-2y)
n. - n·2--a2 4(3-f)2'
4(3-f)2
2

.....:....._____::~

I-

3-

cs· =a2 <sr-2of-4r+25)
8(3-f)2

w· =cs· + "n. =a2 (Sr-2of-4r+25)+4(2-y) 2 +2(3-2y) 2
LJ

8(3- T)2

I

If firm 1 merges with firm 2, then market proceeds up to a duopoly and firm 1 faces
2

the decisionMax{ll =
q)l.2)

L p<
i=)

12
•

>q;<'· 2>}, and firm 3 maximizes its own profit:

I

qo.2)
'

= q02>
2 =a

1
1, qo.2>
=a3
2(y+2)
(y+2)

0.2> - P02> -a 1
o.2> =a 1
PI ....,. 2 - (y+2)'P3
(y+2)
IJ0.2>
I

= nc12) =a2
2

1

2(y+ 2)2 '

IJ0.2>
3

cso.2> = a2 (1 + y)
(2+ y)2
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=a2

1
(y+ 2)2

w(l,2)

=cs<J.2) +" n(l,2) =a2
~

I

(3 + y)

(2+yf

If firm 1 merges with firm3, then:
q<J.3)

=a (2- y)
(l,3)

PI
n(l,3)

=a2

I

=.!.a

3'

=_!_a, q<U>
=a
3

, q<U>
2

6(1 + y)

I

p 11,3 1

2

3

=.!.a

9

=a (3 -

y)

6

=.!.az

(2-y) n(l,:l)
18(1 + y) ' 2

cs<I.3)

p<L:ll

3''

1
2(1 + y)

'

nil.3)
3

=a2

(3-y)
)2(1 + y)

=a2 (t3r +24y+46)
72(1+ y) 2

w(1,3)

= cs(1,3)

+" rr~1,3)
"-.J

I

= a2 (llr +56y+ 80)
72(1 + y)2

3.3.1 Effects on Price and Quantity

In this section I derive the straightforward Figure C1 and Figure C2 to show how the
equilibrium prices and quantities are affected by a merger. The analysis in this part is
helpful and necessary for understanding the results of merger profitability.

p,(y)(i =I, 2): a

p,(y):a
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Figure C 1: Imf!acts on Prices

From C1, it is obvious that any-bilateral merger would cause price increasing, firm 1
and firm 2 share the same price changing( See Figure C1: A). Since firm 1 and firm 2
are symmetric to firm 3, it is not surprising to find consistent price trend operating
here. Firstly, to firm 1, equilibrium price is the largest when it merges with firm 2
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given substitute parameter, and the price will hold with the changing of substitute
parameter when it merges with firm 2. In other words, firm 2 tread on the heels of
firm 1. Then, let us take a look at firm 3, obviously, when firm 1 chooses to merge
with firm 3, firm 3 could increase equilibrium price most. Nevertheless, the
corresponding increased space after the merger between firm 1 and firm 3 is more
limited than the merger between firm 1 and firm 2.
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Figure C2: Impacts on Quantities

Following the analysis above, I ask how the firms choose quantities after a
merger. Generally speaking, insiders of a merger would decrease output, but the
outsider is likely to be encouraged to increase output. To the merging firm (firm
1, See Figure C2: A), it would decrease its output whichever to merge with, but
for small y, it could decrease output most when merging with distant competitor.
When firm 2 is the outsider, it benefits from increasing its output and has
incentive to increase its output, while being the insider definitely decreases
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output to increase profit of merged entity. Similar logical thinking is true for firm
3, the outsider would be encouraged to increase output and insiders would be
encouraged to decrease output.

3.3.2Merger Profitability and Optimal Strategy in Semi-asymmetric Model

Lemma2

if and only ijo < r < o. 7653;

i.

Merger between firm 1 and firm 2 is profitable

zz.

Merger between firm 1 and firm 3 is always non-profitable and merger paradox
exists wheneverO < y< 1.

The merger paradox analysis is consistent with other researchers' results, which
demonstrates that distant competitor should be distant enough. In an oligopoly
market, when a merger occurs, the whole sale price for products of merging entity
are normally expected to increase and the total quantity to decrease. In my model, the
outsider would not excuse itself from charging higher price and would follow the
insider to increase its product price. From the corresponding price equations, it is
seen that the all product prices increase whatever how the relationship between two
parameters look like. For both the insider and outsider, they all could benefit from
this point. Although they do not collude with each other, the concentration by a
merger results in unilateral effect.

For the outsider, however, it is a good opportunity to expand the quantity and race to
control the market and thus insiders are harmed. The more the distant competitor is
close to the acquirer, the more the distant competitor could benefit. This is not
difficult to understand, imagine, when the distant competitor is close enough to the
insiders, it would be easier for the consumers' to accept its products. From the
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perspective of outsider, when the outsider is very distant from the insider, the
possibility for the consumers who consuming the products of merging entity shift
their consumption toward the outsider is very small.

To conveniently explore the reasons behind this lemma, I measure free-riding of
(l.2)

outsider by

q
- 3-

q;

•

It could be showed that when 0< y<0.7653 ,free-riding
q(l.2)

(1,2)

measurement~ is an increasing function in
~

r.

a(--.l..,---)
namely
q~ > 0' and for large

ar

r'

free-riding by firm 3, the outsider, is large and tum out to be very harmful. When the

benefits by outsider are small, the merging firm is more confident to choose to merge
with close competitor. When the merger between firm 1 and firm 2 occurs, they share
the same increasing price while the merged entity distributes the output quotas in the
two production lines differently and line 2 decreases the most quantity than original
equilibrium quantity. The outsider, firm 3 would choose to increase its output. Thus
whether or not to merge with firm 2 depends on balance of merger benefits and
outsider free-riding. When the merger between firm 1 and firm 3 occurs, the insider
increase corresponding prices for the two products and decrease quantities produced,
and the more distant the distant competitor is, the more quantities of product 3 are
decreased. While the outside, firm 2, a complete free-rider of the price of product 1,
could increase its output more than original equilibrium output.

At his moment, the

benefits from merger with firm 3 is completely offset by outsider, it is not surprising
to find that to merge with firm 3 is non-profitable.

Based on the analysis of above, it is easy to understand why to merge with firm 3 is
not always profitable. Firm 1 and firm 2 are homogeneous and outputs by firm 2 are
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perfect substitute of outputs by firm 1. When firm 1 merges with the distant
competitor, the market share quitted by firm 1 will be completely grabbed by firm 2.
In other words, it is completely of no use to sacrifice quantity to charging higher
price for product 1.

Lemma3

if and only ifJ < r < 0·7653;

i.

The optimal strategy for firm 1 is to merge with firm2

ii.

The merging firm has no incentives to merge with any firm when 0.7653 < r <I.
From lemma 1 to lemma 2, the conclusion is made that the optimal strategy for
proposer is to merge with close competitor when it is profitable to do so or any
bilateral merger would not occur. In semi-asymmetric market, a rational acquirer is
not willing to acquire a distant competitor. Whether to merge the homogenous
competitor depends on how far away the distant competitor is.

3.3.3Consumer Surplus and Social Welfare

Assuming a merger occurs, Figure 3 shows how the consumer surplus is influenced
by the merger.

Lemma4
i.

A profitable merger is harmful to consumer surplus (social welfare) and the
resulting consumer surplus (social welfare) is a decreasing function in y.

ii.

When a profitable merger with close competitor (i.e. merger between firm] and
firm 2 occurs, social welfare decrease less than consumer surplus, i.e.
(W' -W( 1•2 l)<(CS' -CS 0 ·2l);

iii.

And the decreasing amount of consumer surplus is a decreasing function with
33

substitute index between products of firm 1 and firm 2, while the decreasing
amount of social welfare is increasing function, i.e. -'-------'a(cs· -cs"·"> < 0• a(w· -w"·"> > 0

ar

ar

CS(r)

u
1.0

0.8

cs

0.4

....----/ ......................... ~ .......... "' .. " ..... .
....
0.2

0.6

0.4

0.8

1.0

Figure C3: Impacts on Consumer Surplus

Even though, the merger between firm 1 and firm 3 is beneficial to increase
consumer surplus but it is not realizable because of profitability. The only choice for
merging firm is to merge with firm 2 and when it is profitable to do so, it is harmful
to consumer surplus. The more close the distant competitor, the more harmful the
merger between merging firm and close competitor. This is not difficult to
understand: the more close the distant competitor, the more concentrated the firms.
W(r)

... ...
0.2

.

0.6

0.4

. ...

1.0

Figure C4: Impacts on Social Welfare

From Figure C4, a merger hurts social welfare. When the merger with firm 2 ( the
only possible profitable merger in this model) occurs, the decreasing amount,
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compared to the original equilibrium, of social welfare after a merger is a increasing
function of substitute parameter of distant competitor.

3.4Asymmetric Substitutability

Next, I turn to the main question of whether mergers are profitable in the original
Cournot model and which merger is more profitable from the viewpoint of the
acquiring firm, firm 1.

Here, both

~

and y range from zero to one but could not be zero or one. From the last

section, it is known that dropping product line would not occur when a merger occurs.
This part will analyze merging firm's profitability, optimal strategies, influences on
the price and quantities, and how the consumer surplus is affected by the merger
without dropping. The following reference figure shows the understanding for the
intuition of the results in Cournotmodel. And for convenience, the merger between
firm 1 and firm 2 is denoted as (1,2) and merger between firm 1 and firm 3 is
denoted as (1,3).
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FigureCS:Profitable Mergers and Optimal Mergers in Cournot Model

I. Merger Paradox Exits
II. (I ,2) and (I ,3) are profitable, (I ,3) is the optimal
III. Only (I ,2) is profitable

3.4. 1 Merger Profitability

It can be shown that, given

p there exists unique y({J) and

reP) such that:

en?· >+ni'· >)- en;+ n;) > o, re eo. refJ))
en:'· +n~'· >)- en;+ n;) =o, r =r<fl)
en:'· +n~'· >)- en;+ n;) < o, re erefJ), 1)
en:l,3) +n~l,3))- en;+ n;) < o, re eo. refJ))
en:'· +n~l, ))- en; +n;) =o, r = refJ)
cn:'· +n~'· >)- en;+ n;) > o, re <r<fJ), 1)

l
l

2
2

2

2

>
>

2

2

3

2 3
' >

3

>

3

(22)

Thus, the following proposition is established.
Proposition 1

i.

Merger between firm 1 and firm 2 is profitable
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if and only if condition AI:

0 < r < min {y(p), Pl < I holds.
Proof. See Appendix.
The conclusion is consistent with lemma 1 and demonstrates that only if when the
distant competitor is distant enough, the merger with close competitor is profitable.
When o< p < 1, given p, free-riding measurement q\1. ) is a decreasing function in p ,
2

q~

namely a<q;'.''> (See the illustration on the section of Influences on Unilateral Effects).
_q'-<0

ap

When p is large, the free-riding degree by firm 3 is small. In fact, the more close
the close competitor to the merging firm, the more difficult the outsider competes
with them. In other words, when

p

is smaller, the benefits of insiders by merger

would be offset by outsiders. And thus, it is required that outsider should be more
distant to prevent its free-riding and harms to insiders. Obviously, the requirement on
the distance of outsider to insiders is stricter than that of semi-asymmetric model.
ii.

Merger between firm 1 and firm 3 is profitable

if and only if condition A2:

y(p) < r < p < arcy(p) < 0.5550 holds.
Proof . See Appendix.
In lemma 2, I conclude that to merge with firm distant competitor is never be
profitable when there is homogenous substitute product for merging firm.
Nevertheless, to merge with distant competitor could be profitable when the two
substitute parameters satisfy the formulated relationship. In such an asymmetric
industry structure, the outsider (the close competitor) turns out to be more-matched
in strength with the target (the distant competitor). Therefore, the insiders are enabled
the ability to bargain with the outsider and win back the merger benefits.

3.4.2 Target Optimal Strategy and Equilibrium
Proposition 2
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Scenario 1: If 0.5550 < y(/3) < y < f3 <I, neither the merger between firm 1 and firm
2 nor one between firm 1 and firm 3 are profitable, merger paradox exists.
Proof. See Appendix.
When both competitors are very close to the merging firm, the insiders could not
resist the corrosive influence of outsider and the merging firm finds no endogenous
incentives to intrigue a merger. This proposition helps explain why oligopoly with
three members exists and holds up.

Scenario 2: WhenO < y< min{y(/3), f'(/3)} < 1, the merger between firm 1 and firm 2 is
profitable but the merger between firm 1 and firm 3 is non-profitable, the optimal
strategy for firm 1 is to merge with firm 2.
Proof . See Appendix.

Scenario 3: When AI and A2 holds, both the mergers between firm 1 and firm 2 or
firm are profitable and the total profit after merger between firm 1 and firm 3 is large
than that between firm 1 and firm 2, the optimal strategy for firm 1 is to merge with
firm 3.
Proof . See Appendix.
Proposition 2 conveys a message that whenever it is profitable to merge with firm 3, it
is the optimal strategy.

To analyze these reasons behind this proposition, I go back to the equilibrium before
a merger occurs. Since the original market is asymmetric, the distant competitor has
already made use of its product differentiation to dominate larger market share and
earns larger profits than the other two firms. Firm 3 is more alluring than the firm 2
so that the merging firm is able to increase larger market share and profits and gain
louder voice in the market.
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In Cournot market in which firms compete with each other by quantity, to expand its
market share is the most attractive incentive to merge for a proposer. A merging firm
is expected not to miss the opportunity to increase its concentration whenever it is
profitable to do so. In the next section, I would continue to discuss how the merger
influences the prices.

3.4.3 The Unilateral Effects

In this part, I would like to investigate how the unilateral effect depends on the
degree of substitutability after a merger. For example, I measure the unilateral effect
p(l.2)

with ratio:

P'

.

Under the condition (Al), the merger between firm 1 and firm 2 is profitable, from
equations (4) and (8), the following unilateral effect measurement is as follows:
_P_it._2>

p~

=_P_~~·-2> = (/3 + I)( f - f3- 2)

p;

<r -2/3-2)

_P_t_2> =_2....:.;(y'-----'/3'-----....:.1)~('f-:---..:../3_-_2..:;_)
•
(2r- f3-2)<r -2/3-2)

p;

p(1,2)

a-~.-

Pi

ar
P

=

2rP(/3 + 1)

<0

(2+2/3-Y)

(l,2)

a-~-

•

PI

ap

(2+4f3-3r +2/3 2 -2/)r + y
(2+2/3-r)

4

)

= (2+2/3- y) + 2(/3 + 1)(/3- y) + y4) > 0

(2+2/3- y)

This states that when the insider is closer and the outsider is more distant, the
merging party is able to charge higher price.
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(23)

2PC4+2P 2 +6P+4y +3fP+r4 -6Pr-4r-4r~ -2P 2 r)
(2+ P- y) 2 (2+2P- y) 2

p,

=~~~--~--~--~~~~~~~~--~~

= 2PC20-r)(2+P 2 +3P+2y)+3fP+r4 )
(2+ p- y)\2+ 2p- y) 2

>O

apj'-2)

p; _2y(4-6P+3r-Y'+P r-2P
2

-----ajJ-

(2+P-r)\2+2P-Y)

2

)

2

_ 2y(4-6P+3r'- Y4 + P 2 r-2P 2 )
=

(2+P-Y) 2 (2+2P-Y) 2
2

2

2r(40-P)+2Cr-P)+<r-P )+P <r-t)-y) <O
(2+ P- Y) 2 (2+2P-Y) 2

It is obvious that substitute parameters affect prices of insiders and outsider

differently.

Specifically, when the outsider is more differentiated from the insider or the insiders
are closer, the resulting price of firm 3, the outsider, would be lower. When a merger
occurs, the resulting prices for products of both outsider and insider are expected to
increase.

Under the condition (A2), the merger between firm 1 and firm 2 is profitable, from
equations (4) and (12), the following unilateral effect measurement is as follows:

= (2+ /3- f)(4-5f +3f3f + f3y-2f3- r/F)
2
(2- r)<4-sr- /3 + 2/3r)
2
P~l.3) = <2+ f3-r)<4-4f- /3 + Pr -2r+ Pr+ r~)
p;
(2+ f3-2r)<4-sr- /3 2 +2f3r)
Pi'·3)- (l-r)<2+f3-r)<r+2-f3)
7- <2- r)<4-sr- /3 2 + 2f3r)
p,<u>
p~

Then, using the similar analysis above, I obtain the following results:
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(24)

a P;l~3)

aP~o~·~

p,
p,
--<or>O - - < 0

ar

· ap
a~
a-p,
p,
--<0--'-<0
ar · ap
p().3)

PIU)
3
,-

The anti-monopoly authority is possible to disagree with the merger between
merging party and its close competitor if the unilateral effects are checked.
Specifically, whether in the merger between firm 1 and firm 2 or in the merger
between firm 1 and firm 3, consumers would face higher prices when the outsider is
more differentiated from the insiders. In other words, with this perspective of
interpretation, to merge with close competitor harms more than merge with distant
competitor, which is usually the view hold by anti-monopoly authority. For example,
the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines states briefly that one high-end product may
compete more fiercely with another high-end product than the low-end product. The
central to the evaluation of unilateral price effects is the extent of direct competition
between products sold by the merging firms.

3.4.4 Impacts on Consumer Surplus and Social Welfare

Using the equations (3) to (15), I obtain the corresponding equilibrium consumer
surplus equations and social welfare equations are formally as:

cs' = a 2 (12-18y + /3 2 + 12/3 -4rf3 -2/3'1 +8y')
S('f-/3-2) 2

cs<J. 2 > = a 2 (6-9y +2/32 +8/3-3f3y +4y')
4(y -2/3-2) 2
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CS 0 · >=
3

2

a
(48+80,By -32r-32,8 2 -8rf3-96y +32r/3 2
8(4-Sy- ,8 2 +2,8y) 2

(

2 S)

-14y ,8 2 -1 Or/33 +8,8 3 -66y',B- 2y ,8 3 -IO,By4 + 20y',8 2 + 17y4 + 64y' + ,84 )

w· = cs· + n' = a(4y- ,8 -6)
2(y-,8-2)

2

2

a (12 -I8y + ,8 + 12,0 -4rf3- 2,By +8y')
8(y-,8-2) 2
2

2

wo.z> = cso.2> +no.2> = a(3y- ,8 -5) _ a (6-9y + 2,8 +8,8 -:.,By +4y')

4(y- 2/3- 2) 2

2(y- 2,8- 2)
w<u)

=csn.3) + 0 o.3) =a <r- 2)(y-2+ ,8)+(,8- 2)(3y- ,8- 2)+ (y-1)(,8- 2- y)
2(4-Sy- ,8 2 + 2,8y)

2

r a
r
8(4-5 -P +2P )
2

2

(48+sopf -32r-32,82 -8rf3-96f +32rf3 2 -t4fP2

(26)

-lOr/33 +8P3 -66r P-2fP3 -loPr4 + 2orP 2 +t7r4 +64r' + ,84 )

Proposition 3

i.

Any profitable merger is harmful to consumers;

ll.

Any profitable merger decreases social welfare.

Proof . See Appendix.
Obviously, the consumer surplus is determined by the quantities in the market. In
Cournot Model, any bilateral merger would result in price increase of all products,
while the outsider possible to increase its output. Any profitable merger is able to
decrease the quantities, even if the outsider increase its output, the amount is not
enough to supplement the amount decreased by insiders, and thus consumers have
fewer products to consume. In the previous analysis, I mention that merging firm is
always induced to merge with distant competitor whenever it is profitable to do so
and is largely because of the appeal for market share and concentration.

It is not strange to find that social welfare is negative whichever two types of merger
occurs since there are no efficiency gain caused by reduction of cost (No cost is
discussed in this thesis). The underlying intuition is as follows. Although, merging
party gains more profits by merging with distant competitor, they are not sufficient
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large enough to make up the loss of consumer welfare. Absence of cost savings, as
Williamson ( 1968) demonstrated, a merger invariably yields a dead-weight loss.
Output coordination with a competitor reduces consumer surplus and social welfare.
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Chapter 4 Horizontal Mergers under Bertrand Competition
4.1 Theoretical Framework

For the Bertrand Competition Model, I also consider three-firm industry and organize
the demand system as follows. For firm 1, the firm 2 is still the closer competitor and
the firm 3 is the distant competitor. In Bertrand Competition Model, firms compete in
price to maximize their own profits. In this section, I formally analyze the effects of
mergers on profitability and product dropping. Considering the plausibility of
demand system, I develop the price-setting system as follows 5 .
ql =ao(l-r-q)- P1 +'Z"pz +qp3
q2

=a0 (1-r-q)- p 2 +'Z"p1+ qp3,0 < q < 'Z" < 1

q3

=ao(l-r-q)- PJ +qpi +qpz

(27)

Before merger, the equilibrium prices, quantities and profits are represented by
(p;8 ·,qr.nr), i=1,2,3; After the merger between firm 1 and firm 2, the prices,

quantities and profits are represented by ( P;B(l. 2)' qi80 ·2>' TI~ 0 · 2 ))

'

i= 1,2,3; After the

merger between firm 1 and firm 3, the prices, quantities and profits are represented by
(p;B<I,3J, q~(1,3), n~(1,3J).

Similar to the analysis in Cournot Model, I will present how I develop Bertrand
Model in this Chapter. To keep the consistency with Cournot Model, the same
assumption is made: A monopoly is inhibited but a duopoly after a merger is allowed.
To keep later analysis and the results clean, this system does not derive from the
Cournto Model, nevertheless, it does not affect the conclusions for Bertrand Model.
In this model, the condition

0<q<r

< 1 has little difference from the one:

5

To examine the implication of asymmetry in Bertrand Model, I tried different models. To make sure

the economic plausibility of this model, the above model is adopted. Although, I could also derive the
demand system directly from the previous Cournot Model, the result is intractable and difficult to deal
with.
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0 < y < f3 ~I in Cournot Model. The value of r cannot be one since the maximum
influence factor of price on quantity comes from the product itself and the value is
one. Even if the Bertrand model is derived from original Cournot model, r = 1
should be removed for the same reason. Thus, the following demonstrations mainly
focus on the condition 0 < ; < r < 1 .

Before a merger occurs, each firm maximizes its profits Il = p;q;, the first-order
(p)

conditions are:

(28)

The second-order conditions are as follows:

a2 ni < o l., j.-- t ' 2' 3

--2--

dp;
The equilibrium prices, quantities and profits are as follows:
s• _ s• _ a0 (;+2)(1-r-;) 8 • _ a0 (2;-r+2)(1-r-;)
P1 - P2 2(-;2-r+ 2)
2(-;2-r+ 2) ,p3 s• _

s• _ a 0 (q+2)(1-r-;)

q1 -q2

-

2(-q2 -r+2)

s• _ a0 (2q-r+2)(1-r-q)

·%-

2(-; 2 -r+2)

(29)
(30)

true, which is quite similar to the market structure in the Cournot model considered
earlier. That is, with the most differentiated product, Firm 3 has the greatest market
power and thus earns the highest profit.
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If firm

1 and

firm

2 merge,

then they max1m1ze their total

profits

IT = p 1q1 + p2q2 .Firm 3 maximizes its profit Il 3 = p3q3 •
(p))

(J>J·i'2)

The first order conditions are:

(32)

The second order conditions are:
2
02 rr
0 2rr _
0 rr
. 02rr i 02 rr '>o·
.
_
_
;<o·-t23--;
_
,_
·-12· ·
:I 2 l - ' '
:I 2
:I
2
:I :I
:I :I
l, J - ' .l 'i= J

op;

op;

op j

op;op j op;cJP j

Then it is obtained:
PB(I,2)

= PB(I,2) = ao(q+2)(1-T-q)

I

q,B(t,2) =q:(l, 2 )

2

PB(I,2)

2(-q 2-2T+2) '

= ao(q+l-T)(l-T-q)

3

(-q 2-2T+2)

= a0 (1- T)(~ + 2)(1- T- ;-) 'q:o.2l = a0 (;- + \- T)(1- T- ;-)

2(-;- -2T+2)
2
2
f1B(I,2) =f1B(1,2) = a/(q+ 2) (l-T)(l-T-q) f1B(I,2)
I
2
4(-q2 -2T+2)2
' 3

(33)
(

(-;- -2T+2)
= a 0 2(q+ 1-T)2(1-T-q) 2
(-q2 -2T+2)2

34 )

(35)

If firm 3 is the target, then firm 1 and 3 maximize their total profits

IT
(PJ•PJ)

and firm 2 maximize its own profit

IT

= p 2q2 •

(PJ•P2)

The first order conditions are:
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= p 1q1 + p 3%

an
=a (1-r-t5)-2p +Tp +2~p 3 =0
api
aTI =a (1- r- u)s:
-a2 p + r p + ~ p =0
'Pz
an
(p,.p,J

1

0

2

2

2

0

1

(36)

3

~,.p,J =a0 (1-r-8)-2p 3 +2~p 1 +~p 2 =0

'P3

The second order-conditions are as follows:

It is obtained:
P 8 o. 3> = a 0 (~+ 2)(~+r+ 2)(1-r-~)
1
2(4-5~ 2 -r 2 -2r~ 2 )
p 80 .3> = a0 (2 + -r)(3~ + 2- r)(l- r- ~)

(37)

2(4-5~ 2 -r2 -2r~ 2 )

3

p 80 .3> = a0 (1 +~)(2+-r-~)(1-r- ~)
2
2
2
(4-5~ 2 -r -2r~ )
2

2

2

qB0.3> = a0 (4-5~ -3r~ +T~+2r+~r )(1-r-~)
1
2 2
2
2(4-5' -t -2r, )
3

q:o.3> = a 0 (4-4~ - t - t ' + 2'+r~-, )(1-r- ')
2 2
2
2(4-5' -r -2r~ )
2

2

2

(38)

q:o.3> = a 0 (1+,)(2+r-~)(1-r-~)
2
2
2
(4-5~ -r -2r~ )
2
2
2
2
Il~0.3J = a 0\,+2)(,+t+2)(4-5' -3r' +r,+2r+,r )(1-r-,)
2 2
2 2
4(4-5' -r -2r~ )

n:(l,3) = ao (2+r)(-t+3~+2)(4-4~
2

2

-r2 -r,2 +2~+r,-~

2 2
2 2
4(4-5' -r -2t~ )

3

)(1-r-~)

2

Il~0.3J = a/(1+~)2(2+-r-,)2(1-r-,)2
22
2
2
(4-5~ -r -2r, )
(39)

+ n8(1,3)

-

2

2

2

2

ao (~+ 2)(~+ r+ 2)(4 -5~ -3r~ + r~+ 2r+ ~t )(1- r- ~)
I
3
4(4-5~2 -r2 -2r~2)2
2
2
2
2
3
2
a (2+r)(3~+2-r)(4-4~ -r -t~ +2~+t'-~ )(1-r-~)
....................... + 0
2 2
22
4(4-5' -r -2r~ )
Il8(1,3)
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2

It follows that p I8 <1.3> > P28 <1.3> > p 38 <1.3J and

q~0- 3 J
-

> ql8 <1.3> > q38 0- 3>.

4.2 Dropping Product Line

Here I consider whether the merging party has incentive to drop a (competing)
product line. When merger between firm 1 and firm 2 occurs, dropping product 1 or
product 2 is the same. After dropping product 1, merging entity and firm 3 maximize
their own profits respectively, the first order conditions are:
an =ao(l-q)-2p2 +qp3 =0

ap2

(39)

an
-=ao(l-q)-2p3+qp2 =0
ap3

The second order conditions are as follows:
a

2

2

ndl

ap/

< 0 a n3dl < 0

· ap/

The profit functions of merging entity and the outsider are obtained:
08(1,2) = ao2(1-q)2 08(1,2) = ao2(1-q)2
dl
(2-~·i ' 3dl
(2-q)2

(40)

q = q<t.z)d ('f) is uniquely defined such that:

{

n~(l.2) + n~(l.2)

> 0 ~~1.2),

'"e (O, '"(1.2)d <
= q<l.2)d <t')
'"e (q<l.2)d < t')

n~(l.2)

+ n~(l.2) = 0 ~~1.2),'"

n~(l.2)

+ n~(l.2) < 0 ~~1,2),

1'))

(41)

1'),

When merger between firm 1 and firm 3 occurs and the merging party chooses to
drop product 1, merging entity and firm 2maximize their own profits respectively, the
first order condition are:

(42)

The second order condition:
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<f ndl < 0
dp/

2

a

n3dl

' dp/

<0

The profit functions of merging entity and outsider are obtained:
n8(1,3)

= ao2(1-;)2

n8(1.3)

(2-;i '

dl

= ao2(1-;)2
(2-;)2

2dl

(43)

When merger between firm 1 and firm 3 occurs and the merging party chooses to
drop product 3, merging entity and firm 2maximize their own profits respectively, the
following profits are obtained by repeating the similar steps as above.
TIB(1,3)

d3

=a/(1--x/

(2--xl '

n8(1,3)

= a/(1--xl

2d3

(2--xl

(44)

Since T > ; , the merging firm would choose to drop product 1 when merger between
firm 1 and firm 3 occurs.
; =;

0 ·3ld ( -r) is

uniquely defined such that:

{

n~(l.3)

+ n:(l.3) > n~~l.3),; e

n~(l.3)

+ n:o.3>

n~(l.3)

+n~(l.3) < n~~l.3),; e

co, ;(1.3)d <-r))

= n~?·3),; = ;(1.3)d <-r)
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<;(1.3)d ( -r), -r)

(45)
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Figure B I: Dropping Product Line after Merger
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LemmaS
1.

Under the merger ( 1,2), dropping occurs in region A but not occur in region B.

ii.

Under the merger ( 1,3 ), dropping occurs in region C but not occur in region D.

Although, it is quite time consuming and expensive for the merging parties to drop
products after a merger, for convenience, the assumption is made here that drop
products after a merger is costless 6 .

The result is consistent with our intuition. The merging party is not willing to drop
the product line when both the two substitute parameters are small since
cannibalization is not large that the merging party has no strong incentive to drop
product line. Greater substitutability between the products combined by the merger
presumes more competition internalized by the merger (See Gandhi, Froeb, Tschantz,
and Werden (2008)). To reduce cannibalization, the merging party is willing to drop
one of product line and keep one product line to compete with the outsider.

4.3Asymmetric Substitutability

Having examining the incentive of dropping product line, now I turn to the issue of
merger profitability.

6

Gandhi, Probe, Tschantz and Werden (2008) also assume that firms' products repositioning after a
merger are instantaneous and costless.
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4.3.1 Merger Profitability
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Figure 82: Profitable Mergers and Optimal Mergers in Bertrand Model
I. (I ,2) dropping and (1.3) dropping are more profitable than not dropping, and they are the optimal
strategies( they are equivalent in fact)
11.(1 ,3) dropping product 1 is more profitable than not dropping,
(I ,2) no dropping product is the optimal strategy

III.(l ,3) no dropping product is more profitable than dropping,
(I ,2) no dropping product is the optimal strategy

Figure B2 provides straightforward interpretation of following results in Bertrand
Model.
Proposition 4

Under the conditionO <; < min{l-r, r} < 1, all mergers (1,2) without dropping and
(1,3) without dropping product line are profitable.

Proof. See Appendix
This proposition does not contradict with the conclusion made by Deneckere and
Davidson (1985).Under symmetric differentiated price-setting model, a merger is
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always beneficial and any size of merger is profitable. When the plausible conditions
on the demand are satisfied in asymmetric model, any merger is profitable (since
firm 1 and firm 2 are the same to firm 3, merger between firm 2 and firm 3 could be
reviewed as the merger between firm 1 and firm 3). Even without cost saving, the
incentive to merger in non-cooperative oligopoly model still exists. The reason given
by them is the upward sloping reaction functions, therefore it is not surprising to find
in my model that whichever the merging firm choose to merge with, they are
profitable and merger paradox the issue raised in quantity-setting games is not found
in the asymmetric differentiated Bertrand Model.

Note that not all the mergers with dropping are profitable. When the products in the
market are very distant (small substitute parameters), the price competition is not so
fierce and there is no need to drop product line to reduce cannibalization between
products of merging entity. Only when the price competition is so competitive, the
merging party has incentive to drop product line.
4.3.2 Target Optimal Strategy and Equilibrium
Proposition 5

Under Bertrand Competition, (1,2) is always the optimal strategy although it is
equivalent to (1, 3) in region I offigure B2.
Scenario 1: Under the condition ~(I,ZJd (T) < ~ < min{l-T, T} < 1, merger (1,2) with
dropping product 1( or 2) and merger (1,3) with dropping product 1 would result in
similar equilibrium and are the optimal strategies for the merging firm.

Under the given condition, merger (1,2), (1,3) with or without dropping are all
profitable and a merger with dropping product is more profitable than a merger
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without dropping. To reduce cannibalization between merger products, the merging
firm is willing to drop product 1 (or 2) when merger (1,2) occurs and to drop product
1 when merger (1,3) occurs. When the market reaches equilibrium, only firm 2 (or
firm1) and firm 3 are left to compete. But there are differences, the merging firm
produces product 1 or product 2 when it chooses the merger ( 1,2) while the merging
firm produce product 3 when the merger ( 1,3 ).

Scenario 2: Under the condition ~ 0 • 3 >d ( -r) < ~ < ~0 • 2 >d ( -r), merger (1, 3) with dropping is
more profitable than merger (1,3) without dropping, merger (1,2) without dropping
product 1(or 2) is the optimal strategy for merging firm.

Under the given condition, merger (1,2) with dropping product line is the optimal.
There are only firm 2(or firm 1) and firm 3 competing, which is the same with the
above equilibrium. Nevertheless, quite differently, merger (1,3) would not occur even
if merger (1,3) is a profitable merger. The merged entity gains more benefits by
reducing competition between merged products.

Scenario 3: Under the conditionO < ~< ~O.JJd (-r), both mergers (1,2) and (1,3) without
dropping product line are profitable than with dropping, the merger (1,2) without
dropping is the optimal strategy for merging firm.

This result suggests significant insights: although there is some competition between
merger products, the competition is not so harmful when the products are initially
quite vey distant to each other, the merger is less anticompetitive than when the
products are very close in price-competition model. The close competitor, firm 2, is
always the best target for the merging firm. Under this scenario, a close competitor
decreases the firm's ability to charge higher price and, intuitively, a merging firm has
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incentive to merge with the competitor involving the fiercest competition with
merging firm. Not surprisingly found, merger with close competitor is the optimal for
merging firm.
4.3.4 Unilateral effects
Similar to the analysis in Coumot Model, I measure the unilateral effect of a merger
by the ratio of the post-merger price and the pre-merger price. For example, the
B(I,2)

unilateral effect of merger (1,2) for product i is measured by: ~, since merger
P;
between firm 1 and firm 2 is more profitable than merger between firm 1 and firm 3,
I consider only the unilateral effects for this merger. Note that by symmetry, when
firm 1 and firm 2 merges, the unilateral effect on product 1 and 2 are the same. The
measures of unilateral effect of merger (1,2) on three products are given by:
B(I,2)

PB(I,2)

P -=-2-=
_1

Pt

p:•

2- "(- r2
~

2-2T-q

PB(I,2)

2

_3_=
'

p:•

(2 + 2r- 2-r)(2- "(- r2)
~

~

(2+2q--r)(2-2-r-q 2 )

(46)

It is not difficult to show that prices all go up after the merger.

The response of outsider is beneficial to insiders in Bertrand Model, which tends to
harm insiders in Cournot Model. Price-setting competitors reinforce price increase
and this is reason why merger paradox does arise in the above.

Next, I will consider the unilateral effects of merger (1,2) when product deletion
occurs and merger (1,3) when product deletion occurs.
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)

Unilateral effects of merger (1,2) with dropping product line and merger (1,3) with
dropping product line are as follow:
PB(I.3)
PB(1.2)
a__M.!_
a __M.!_

PB(I.2)
PB(l.3)
a __M.!_
a ____li!_
B*
B*

Pz

=
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ar
PB(l,3)
PB(I,2)
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B*
P3

ar

=
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ar

>O
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=
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P2

a~

<O

PB(l,2)
a___l4L_ a___l4L_
PB(I,3)

>O
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=
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When a merger involves dropping product line, close substitute products in the
market create strong incentive to decrease prices in Bertrand model. The unilateral
effects of post-merger involving dropping product line are decreasing functions of
substitute parameter between firm 2 and firm 3.

4.3.5 Impacts on Consumer Surplus and Social Welfare

To find the corresponding inverse demand functions in the Bertrand Model, I rewrite
the original system as follows:
p 1 = (H+I+K)(l-r-,)a0 -Hq1 -lq2 -Kq 3

p 2 =(H+I+K)(l-r-,)a0 -Hq2 -lq1 -Kq3
p 3 = A(l-r-,)a0 -(A-2K)q3 -Kq1 -Kq 2

Where
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(49)

(1-~2)

H=

>0

(1 +T)(1-T- 2~ 2 )

(T+~2)

I=

>0

(1 +T)(l- T- 2~ 2 )

~(1+T)

K=

>0

(1 +T)(l-T- 2~ 2 )

A= (1 +T)(2~+ 1-T) > O
2

(l+T)(l-T-2~ )

(A-2K)>O
And the above condition implies that:
2

(1-T-2~ ) >0

At equilibrium, the utility function of a given consumer can be rewritten as,

U(q;) = a0 (1-T-~)[(H +I +K)q1 +(H +I+ K)q 2 + Aq3 ]

+_!.[Hq12 +Hq~ +(A-2K)qi +21q1q2 +2Kq1% +2Kq2 q3 ]
2
The consumer surplus function is then as follows,
1
2
2
2
CS(q;) =-[Hq
1 +Hq2 +(A-2K)% +21q1q2 +2Kq1q3 +2Kq2 %]
2

(50)

The social welfare function is as follows,
W(q;) = a0 (1-r-~)[(H+I+K)q1 +(H+I+K)q 2 +A%]

1
2
2
2
2Kq q +2 Kq q ]
+-[Hq
1 +Hq 2 +(A-2K)q3 +21q1q2 +
1 3
2 3
2

(51)

Proposition 6
Any profitable merger (with or without product dropping) is harmful to consumer
surplus and social welfare;

Consumers unambiguously suffer from a profitable merger in the price setting model
considered above. Absence of cost-saving, however distant the outsider is away from
the insiders, prices for all products increase and quantities of insiders decrease more
than the increasing amount of outsider after a merger. A profitable merger with
dropping is more harmful to consumers that the merger without dropping. When
dropping occurs, the market moves from triopoly to duopoly, which causes market
concentration and consumers harms more.
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Chapter 5 A Comparison of Bertrand and Cournot

5.1 Comparison of Asymmetric Bertrand and Cournot Competition Model
To capture better interpretation of the above analysis, I would continue to compare
the two models in this chapter. Although Bertrand Competition Model does not
derive from Cournot Competition Model, they are consistent in my analytical
framework.
Table 1: Comparison of Asymmetric Bertrand and Coumot Model
EM

When EM

Price

(1,2)

(1,2)

Insider

+

Outsider(firm 3)

+

Insider

+

Outsider(firm 2)

+

+

Coumot
(I ,2),(1 ,3)

Bertrand

Quantity

PM

(1,3)

cs

w

+

All (I ,2),(1 ,3)

(1,2)

Insider

+

+

Some

wdand

Outsider

+

+

(1,2)wd,

(1,3)wd

Insider

+

Outsider

+

(1,3)wd
Bertrand

All( I ,2),( 1,3)
Some

(1,2)

+

(1,2)wd,
(1,3)wd
PM: Profitable Merger; EM: Equilibrium Merger; CS: Consumer Surplus; W: Social Welfare; (l,i) in this table
refers the merger between firm 1 and firm j without dropping;( I ,i)wd refers the merger between firm I and firm j
with dropping.

When the acquirer accepts the optimal strategy and the state of market reaches to
equilibrium, any bilateral merger increases prices in both models. The increasing
58

price m Cournot Model comes from the concentration of market share and
decreasing output and the resulting prices come from the tradeoff between
concentration of market share and improving competition ability. The outsider makes
use of this opportunity to expand its output. Although sharing the similar merger
characteristics with Cournot, insiders in Bertrand make price choice and increase
their prices to maximize profits. Without exception, any optimal bilateral merger in
both Coumot and Bertrand Model would definitely trigger all firms' increasing price.

In the two types of merger, different changes of quantity are resulted in. In a market
competing by quantity, horizontal mergers will only lead to the decreasing of insiders'
outputs in the market; in a market competing by price, horizontal merger will also
bring outputs decreasing. In Bertrand model, when a merger without dropping occurs,
the concentration will decrease the output, however the competition with outsiders
will increase the output. Such tradeoff influences firming firm's merger direction and
makes close competitor the target as the favorite all along when both are profitable.
When a merger with dropping occurs, the market becomes a duopoly and both the
insider and outsider increase their quantities.

Theoretically, for a merging firm in Coumot Model, to merge with a close competitor
may be a profitable and optimal choice; nevertheless, its most favorite target should
be distant competitor whenever it is profitable to do so. The reasons behind this
should stem from the firm's seeking of market concentration or market share. At this
point, I could conclude that a merging firm would like to merge with a distant
competitor whenever it is profitable.
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In my thesis, consumer surplus largely depends on the outputs of market and, thus, it
is not surprising that consumer surplus change in the same direction of output. If the
competition between firms is price-oriented, although the merger without dropping
bring the decrease of output but the competition with outsider raise more output and
consumers consume less outputs, and the merger with dropping would result much
larger increasing quantities, consumer are not so hurtful. If the competition between
firms is quantity-oriented, output will be largely cut down, consumer surplus is
largely reduced.

Although the previous analyses are not enough to completely explain the mergers in
reality, they provide worthwhile perspectives of interpretation. From the above
analysis, it is concluded that the acquirer would like to merge with distant competitor
when it is profitable to do so. As it is known, in Cournot Competition Model, firms
compete by choosing quantity and by merging with distant competitor, the acquirer is
able to increase its market power by expand market share.

Although for some substitute parameters the acquirer would choose distant
competitor or close competitor as a merger target, the close competitor is the
'favorite' target for the merging firm. To capture the intuitive understanding of this
conclusion, I would like to go back to the characteristic of Bertrand Model. Price is
tool of firms to compete with others and the most horrible threatens come from other
competitors' impacts on their prices. Therefore, the first priority for a merging firm is
to eliminate the one which threatens the price of merging firm most. The closer a
firm is to the merging firm, the more possible the consumers transfer from the output
of merging firm to the competitor if the merging firm charge larger price. Obviously,
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the close competitor is the one which threatens the price of merging firm most and
that is reasons why the acquirer would like to merge with close competitor in
Bertrand Competition Model.
5.2 Comparisons with others Researches: Asymmetric and Symmetric

Table 2: Comparison of Asymmetry and Symmetry

Asymmetry

Symmetry

Coumot

Bertrand

Coumot

Bertrand

Merger Paradox

True

False

True

False

Strategy

Merger with distant

Merger with close

NA

NA

competitor

competitor

Non-dropping

Dropping is possible

NA

NA

Dropping

Look at the merger paradox first. Merger paradox exists in both asymmetric and
symmetric Coumot model and is not true in both asymmetric and symmetric
Bertrand model. However, the merger strategy is quite different in asymmetric
Coumot and Bertrand model, in quantity-setting oligopoly, a distant competitor is the
best target when it is profitable in Coumot model and a close competitor is the
favorite in Bertrand model. In a quantity-setting game, dropping a product after a
merger is a not necessary and as a matter of fact different brand products is helpful to
compete with outsider and occupy market share even if there is some competition
between the merged brand products. That is why the non-dropping situation occurs in
Coumot oligopoly. Nevertheless, in a price-setting game, price competition is the
priority for the firms and the merging firms would balance brand products
competition and market power. When the merged products are very close, brand
competition hurts the merging party and tends to benefit more to the outsider and
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therefore, to drop is able to prevent the cannibalization of merged brand products.

62

Chapter 6 Policy Implication and Conclusion

6.1 Policy Implication
Merger Guidelines in European Union and United States, all mention product
substitutability. Although, it is difficult to identify precise products substitutability
between two firms, these guidelines try to find the evidence to show how the two
products are correlated before a merger. When prices, before a merger occurs, are
positively related, the two products are close substitutes. And when prices fail to
work as a signal, the authorities measure the substitutability by the relationship of
market share. If the market share is negatively correlated, then there are evidences of
close competition. When the insiders of a merger are very close competitor, by the
Merger Guidelines, they will increase prices and eliminate competition in the market
and should be forbidden.

My analysis and the main results actually support the reasoning behind these
guidelines, which demonstrate that a merger between close competitors would
increase price and decrease competition. Firstly, in my analysis, when a merger
occurs in asymmetric oligopoly, a merger with distant competitor cause more harm
than the merger with close competitor, the merger with a distant competitor is able to
increase price most, decrease quantity most and harms consumers most. Thus, it is
not justifiable to declare the proposed merger just because of the evidences of close
substitutes. In another words, when the merging parties are distant competitor, the
governments are suggested not to let down their guard. Even if the insiders are very
distant (in related market), they could lead to competition pressure and increase price.
Secondly, in a market with Cournot characteristics, policy makers might pay more
attention to the distant competitor which tends to be a target for the merging firm;
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and in a market with Bertrand characteristics, they might be care of close competitor
which tends to be the optimal merger target.

It is possible that a merger with close competitor which harms less is refused while

the merger with distant competitor which tends harm more is accepted following the
original merger guidelines. Antitrust authority is suggested to be care of distant
competitor in an asymmetric differentiated market when a merger is proposed. How
asymmetric the market is and the characteristics of market competition should be
factors the government and authority pay attention to.

6.2 Concluding Remarks

In this thesis, I studied how merger incentives depend on product substitutability in
asymmetric oligopoly. It is more likely that merger paradox exists for transactions
involving the firm offering the most differentiated product in the Coumot model. For
the Coumot model, for most portfolios of substitute parameters, merging firm is
expected to merge with close competitor. Nevertheless, whenever it is profitable to
merge with a distant competitor, the merging firm's optimal strategy is to merge with
distant competitor. For the Bertrand competition model, it is more profitable to acquire
a close competitor.

This thesis expands the analysis from the strand of literature focusing on
homogenous or symmetric differentiate model to asymmetric differentiate model for
both Coumot and Bertrand Models. The analysis and interesting results prove the
expansion to be a worthwhile job. Besides, some insights are provided for the
governments and the guideline makers when they judge a merger and make
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corresponding policies.

6.3 Future Extensions

In previous analysis, I build an industry with three firms and develop my train of
analytical thought. Although, the following consideration, perhaps, is not perfect
because of some limitations, it gives some possible directions and ideas for later
research. The analysis enables us to see more exciting characteristics of horizontal
mergers and how the merger moves.

When expanding the symmetric to Asymmetric market assumption, I assume the cost
to be zero, which is one of the limitations of this thesis. Under the assumption of my
thesis, there is not cost efficiency improvement after a merger. In other words, a firm
still has incentives to propose a merger even if a merger could not bring cost saving.
In future researches, to consider mergers in asymmetric market under the assumption
of cost saving tend to be a good point to continue with. On the other hand, in my
model, I consider only three firms and it is a worthwhile job to continue to expand
the tri-industry toN-industry and see what may hold.
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Appendix

Proofs of Lemma 1:
Since,

Thus,
n~l.2)

+ n~l.2)
>1

(1,2)

ndl

From the proof of proposition 2 below, it is known, when A 1 and A2 hold:

Then,

+ n<l.3) > no.2> _ n<l.3)
n (l.3)
I
3
dl dl
Thus, when a merger with distant competitor or close competitor occurs, the merging
party would not drop its product line in Counot.
Proofs of Proposition 1:

i.
When merger between firm 1 and firm 2 is profitable, then it is required that:

Namely,
(a-c)\y-2) 2 (P+l)

(a-c) 2 (y-2) 2

> 2(r.;2 -P-2) 2

2(r.;2 -2P-2) 2

Combining the condition,

O<r</3<1
Solving this inequality,

r

0 < < min{y(/)),/3} < 1

Where y = y(/)) is uniquely obtained from

n:
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12
' >

+lli1' 2> = n; + n; when 0 < y < f3 < 1

Thus, when 0 < y < min { y(fi), fi} < 1 is satisfied, the merger between firm 1 and firm

2 is profitable.
11.

Solving the point when

n

(l.3)

l

+ n<l.})
3

=n<'I · 2)+ n<l.2 2)-- n·I + n·3• o< r < P < 1

(y,fi) = (f/J,f/J) = (0.5550,0.5550)
Solving the curve y = y(fi) when
n~l.3)

+ n~l,3) = n; + n;

As,

a<<ll~l,3) + lljl.3))

-<n; + n;)) = a<n~l.3) + lljl.3))

ap

a<n1; n;) < o,o < P< o.555o

ap

Thus, when 0 < P< arcy(fi) < 0.5550,

Combining the condition,

o<r</3<1
Thus when

y(fi) < r < p < arcy(fi) < fjJ = 0.5550

Merger between firm 1 and firm 3 is profitable.

Proofs of Proposition 2:
From proposition 1 i, since when 0.5550 < y(fi) < y < p < 1which violates the
required conditions in proposition 1 i and proposition 1 ii.
Thus, both mergers with firm 2 and with firm 3 could not be profitable and firm 1 is
not lured to merge.

ii
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Since arcy(/3) e (0, /3) , and thus min {y(/3), arcy(/3)} e min {y(/3), /3}
Thus

condition 0 < y < min {y(/3), arcy(/3)} < 1 satisfies

the

the

condition

m

Since the condition in corollary ii is 0 < y < min {y(/3), y(/3)} < 1implies that

p

r

proposition 1 i 0 < < min {y(/3), /3}
The profitability of merger with firm 2 is proved.

could be any value from zero to one, which definitely violates the requirement
0<

p <0.5550

Thus the merger with firm 3 is non-profitable.
Therefore, the firm would choose to merge with firm 2.

iii
From the proposition i and ii in proposition 1, when both 0 < y < min {y(/3), /3} and
y(/3) <

y < p < arcy(/3) < ¢J = 0.5550 are both satisfied, the profitability with firm 2

and with firm 3 could be proved.
Combine the two conditions, it is obtained
When y(/3) < y < p < arcy(/3) < ¢J = 0.5550, both the mergers between firm 1 and
firm 2 or firm 3 are profitable:

And since,
n· + n·
I

3

= a 2[(2- y) 2+(2+ P-2y) 2l = a 2[2(2- y) 2+2(/3- y)(2- y)]
4(2+P-r)2

4(2+P-r)2
2

a 2 [2(2- y) +2(/3- y)(2- y)]

>--~--~--~~~--~

4(2+2/3-Y) 2

2
2
> a [(2- y) (,8 + 21)]
4(2+2/3-Y)

____;;.;,..._____:_:..........:.:~~

Thus,
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To merge with firm 3 is more profitable.

Proofs for Proposition 3:
Consumer surplus is:

From proposition 1' when 0 <

r < min {y(p), Pl < 1 ' to merge with firm 2 is profitable

~cso.2> = cs<l,2) -cs· =

a2PC2-y)Y(y,p)

sc2+2P- y) 2 (2+ P- y) 2

Where, Y<r.P> =4'1 -12/ -7'/ p-sr +2f)fP+32f +2'J{J+2'J{J -I2P-16-28P<O
2

The reason behind this is simple: even if the outsider could increase its output, it will
not increase too much since the insiders is unable to increase prices by decreasing
quantity and a merger would not occur if outsider increase its output too much. In
Coumot model, a merger is aimed at output coordination even the outsider obeys this
rule, which definitely harms consumers.

Similar proof and intuitive explanation apply to the merger with firm 3.
Thus

cs 0·3> -

cs· < o

It is conclude that any profitable merger is harmful to consumer surplus.
. ·1 ar process app1y to soc1a
· 1 we1~1are, I obtam
· w<l. 2) < w· an dw 0·3> < w· .
S1m1

Proofs of Proposition 4:
The implicit condition is required for the Bertrand Model, I have:
O<;<T,l-T-;>0
Rewrite this condition as:
0 <;<min {T, 1- T} < 1
Then,
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n8(1.2l+n8(1,2)
1
2
nr+n~·

=

(l-t')(-r2-t'+2)2
:o

(-~ -21'+2)
2

a<n~(l, 2 )

+ n~(l.

2

2

= (1- r)(l +

))' <n~·

+ n~·) >

a~

t'

2-~ -21'
2

)z > 1

0

Thus,
0

2

0~ ;~ + n!:t. J = (1- r)(l +
nl + n2

~

)2 > (1- r)(l + _r_)2
2-~ -2r
2-2r

= 4- 4r + 1'

2

>I

4-4r

Merger between firm 1 and firm 2 without dropping is profitable.
And since when the distant competitor is more close to merging firm, the merged
entity could charge higher price and the increase the possibility of larger profits:
a«n~(l.J)

+ n:(l.J))- <n~· + n:·)) >
a~

Thus,
<n~(l.3)

0

+ n:(I.J))- <n~· + n:·)

2
2
>a2( -r)2(2(2+r)(4+2r)+(2+r)(2-r)(4-r ) _ 4+(2-r) )
1
0
4(4-r2)2
4(2-r) 2
2
2
1
1
1
=ao(l-r) ((2-r)z + 4- (2-r)2

1
4)=0

Merger between firm 1 and firm 3 without dropping is profitable.

For small numeric substitute parameters, for example, they are equal to 0.2 and 0.1
respectively, it can be shown that:
B(I,2)
n I

+ nB(l,2) > n(l,2)
2

dl

'

nB(l,3)
I

+ nB(I,3) > n(l,3)
2

dl

While for some larger numeric substitute parameters, for example, they are equal to
0.8 and 0.2 respectively, it can be shown that:
B(I.2)
n I

+ ns(l.2) < 0 (1.2) ns(l.3) + 0 8(1.3) < n<l.3)
2
dl '
I
2
dl

Therefore, not all mergers with dropping are profitable.

Proofs of Proposition 5:
It is shown that:
a«n~(1.3)

+ n:(1.3))- <n~<l.2) + n~(l.2) n > o
a~
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Define the following equation:

f (r, ;) = cn~(l,3) + n:(I.J))- cn~(I,Z) + n~(I,Zl)
Thus,
f(r,;) < f(r, r)

_ a 0 2 2(r+2)(r+ 1) 2 (1-r)(r+ 2)(1-2r) 2
4(r+l) 2 (2-2r-r2 ) 2

2

2

a 0 (r+ 2) (1-r)(l- 2r) 2 =
0
2(-r2 -2r+2) 2

Thus,

Merger with close competitor is always more profitable than the merger with distant
competitor.
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